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Trading Freedom in the Russian Empire: The
Extent to Which Russia Attempted to Solve the
Jewish Question by Granting Jews Rights Only in
Scenarios that Economically Benefited the State

Nathan Hellman

Introduction
Ever since its first known usage during the so-called “Jew Bill”
controversy concerning the naturalization process for English Jews in
the 1750s, the term Jewish Question has connoted a fairly simple,
straightforward idea: How should a state craft policies to “properly”
handle its Jewish population.1 However, its inherent subjectivity and
the sheer multitude of possibilities ensured that no correspondingly
simple, straightforward answer to the Jewish Question was offered in
any country throughout Europe. Mired in centuries-old religious
strife, constantly shifting boundaries and mounds of legislation,
Russia's encounter with the Jewish Question stands out as one of the
most complex— capable of perplexing even its most dedicated and
knowledgeable scholars. Given this track record of bewilderment,
historian Simon Dubnow questioned Tsar Alexander III's request for
the formation of the High Commission for the Study of Existing Laws
on the Jews in early 1883, which followed two years of heavy antiJewish pogroms centered in southwestern Russia. As a student of
history, the quick-witted Dubnow recognized that the group better
1

Dov Kulka Otto, “The Felix Posen Bibliographic Project on Antisemitism,”
The 'Jewish Question' in German Speaking Countries, 1848-1914, A Bibliography,
last modified 1994, http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/bibkulka.html.
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known as the Pahlen Commission faced a “Sisyphus task” that
previous “bureaucratic creations” in Russia had promptly abandoned
due to the perceived impossibility of the task.2 Despite these welldocumented difficulties, one member of the Pahlen Commission
singlehandedly drafted an explanation of the Jewish Question that
belied its perceptions as an endlessly confusing labyrinth of religion
and policy.
In his aptly titled The Jewish Question in Russia, member Pavel
Pavlovich Demidov chronicles the history of the Russian state's
relations with Jews since the Polish Partitions in the late eighteenth
century. Spanning about 110 pages, Demidov's 1884 accounting of
Russian policy includes a cursory overview of the most significant
laws, general trends in legislation affecting Jews and even his own
recommendations for resolving this greatly perplexing problem.
Demidov argues that the only way to improve Jewish-Russian
relations, alleviate Jewish poverty and bolster the empire's economic
vitality is to abolish the Pale of Settlement, grant Jews civil and
residential status equal to other subjects and provide more elementary
school options for Jewish residents.3 Considering the external
circumstances—namely the pogroms—swirling about when Demidov
offered these changes, his recommendations are quite remarkable.
Surprisingly, other Pahlen Commission members agreed with the
general thrust these prescriptions. In fact, as Antony Polonsky
explains, the whole commission proposed to “weaken Jewish
particularism and exploitation by the gradual removal of exceptional

2

Simon Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, from the Earliest
Times Until the Present Day (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America,
1916), 337-338.
3
Pavel Pavlovich Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia (London: Darling
and Son, 1884), 104.

98

Nathan Hellman
legislation,” affecting the Jews.4 As might be expected, Alexander III
rejected such recommendations, thereby dismissing four years (1883
to 1887) of laborious investigation into this crucial issue.5
Demidov hardly seemed to possess the pedigree for such
politically radical stances. Part of an established Russian noble
family, a long-time Russian official and the prince of San-Donato (a
villa in Florence), Demidov figured to come down squarely on the
opposite side of the Jewish Question. But in his The Jewish Question
in Russia Demidov asserts with the utmost frankness a theory about
the “main principle” underlying Russian legislation concerning Jews.
He claims that Russian policy sought to acquire “material benefits for
the State from this race [Jews],'” from its policies affecting Jews in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 6 Deeming this motivating
impulse as a “narrow utilitarian spirit,” that explicitly dictates Russia's
Jewish policy, Demidov presents a number of instances in his report
where the state blatantly admits in the language of its ukases to
allowing Jews to live in areas outside the Pale of Settlement, enroll
their children in schools previously barred to them or gain
employment in once-prohibited industries merely because granting
“such permission would conduce to the benefit of the natives,” the
national economy and the government in general.7
Demidov postulates a fairly conclusive theory about the Jewish
Question, determining its veracity is—much like the question itself—
replete with potential challenges. Due to the sheer number of possible
motivations for how and why the Russian government enacted
legislation resulting in either the restriction of Jewish rights or the
extension of some newfound privileges, no single incentive could
4

Antony Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia (Portland, Ore.: Littman
Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010), 12.
5
Ibid., 13.
6
Ibid., 40.
7
Ibid., 41.
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have guided each and every law the state passed involving the Jews
from the middle of the eighteenth century to Demidov's publication of
The Jewish Question in Russia almost 150 years later. Beyond this
logistical hurdle lies yet another: The relative inaccessibility of
Russian full-text legislation in English translation. Despite the fact
that some translated excerpts are available in Demidov's report as well
as various histories analyzing the Jewish Question in Russia, a
complete accounting of all these laws is impossible to obtain without
proficiency in Russian. With that said, this challenge requires the
historian to cobble together translations of Russian laws from a wide
variety of sources to achieve the highest level of completeness and
accuracy.
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, Demidov raises a
fascinating point that is worthy of further historical exploration. For
reasons already detailed above, the question of whether the Russian
government sought to capitalize on each and every policy regarding
the Jews remains out of reach. However, with dogged historical
research and a keen eye it is possible for us to investigate the extent to
which considerations of economic benefit factored into Russia's
legislative decisions involving Jews, especially those instances where
a “certain extension of civil rights was made in favor of the Jews,” to
secure some sort of advantage for the Russian state.8 The scope of this
exploration should include a few primary sections: First, an
examination of Russia's history of pragmatism in policies affecting
the Jews before the Polish Partitions; second, the extent to which the
enforcement of nineteenth-century laws such as military conscription
in Jewish communities and permitting members of certain industries
to reside outside the Pale of Settlement helped to define the notion of
Jewish “usefulness” in Russia; and, finally, how the state's Jewish
legislation impacted relations between Russians and Jews.

8
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Exploring Demidov's rather simple explanation of the Jewish
Question, reminds the historian once again of the subject matter's
inherent complexity. While Demidov appears to have provided an
accurate prescription of the problem, the sheer simplicity of his theory
practically ensures that it falls short of simultaneously charting the
reasons why it is correct. Sometime in the eighteenth century, the
Russian state seems to have encountered a persistent confrontation
between its traditional religious intolerance—dating far back to its
Muscovite roots—and the potential for economic expansion through
cooperation with Jewish merchants, traders and middlemen who
worked with Poles. At the heart of the matter, religious intolerance—
among other stereotypes such as the constant fear of Jewish
merchants exploiting peasants or innate Jewish deficiency—prompted
the state to enact restrictions on where Jews could reside, the
occupations they were allowed to take up and sundry rights readily
bestowed upon ‘native’ Russian subjects. Many of these restrictions
prohibited Jews from participating in the kinds of economic activity
that had previously proved beneficial to individuals, villages, towns,
districts and the Russian Empire as a whole. In other circumstances,
when the Russian government acquired new land or chose to develop
some unproductive or unsettled part of the empire, they sought Jewish
assistance in the form of residency, working in understaffed fields or
the construction of infrastructure projects despite the fact that laws
often barred Jews from the areas where Jews provided this muchneeded help. In such instances, Russian officials typically repealed the
restrictive measures on Jews in an effort to reclaim squandered
economic vitality. For this reason, Demidov is correct in concluding
that the main principle—but not the only principle—of legislation
concerning the Jews took the form of granting a relaxation of
previously established prohibitions with an eye on deriving some
benefit for the Russian state.
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Pragmatism in Russian Policy Toward the Jews Leading Up to
the Polish Partitions
Beginning in 1772, the Russian Empire continued its westward
expansion by colluding with Prussia and Austria to control then
divide the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Known as the Polish
Partitions, the three Eastern European powers split the region in a
series of annexations in the years 1772, 1793 and 1795. With these
partitions came the shifting of enormous populations of Jews—not
necessarily in physical relocation, but more often in terms of which
country they would call home. As a result, Russia, an empire that had
previously banned Jewish residence, had nearly 290,000 Jews in its
empire, according to estimations of the 1764 Polish census.9 Due to
the roughness of initial estimates provided in the Polish census and
natural population growth within the Jewish community, this figure
expanded with subsequent recalculations. By the close of the
eighteenth century, most widely cited statistics estimated roughly
600,000 Jews—or 1.5 percent of the empire's inhabitants—in
Russia.10 Historian Israel Bartal captures the predicament facing
Polish-Lithuanian Jewish communities as a result of the partitions:
“The most striking change caused by the partitions was the opening of
the Russian empire. A country that, for age-old religious reasons, had
never permitted Jews to reside in it now had annexed regions
inhabited by hundreds of thousands of descendants of the 'God
killers.'”11
While the Polish Partitions represent the natural starting point for
Russia's formal handling of the Jewish Question—since Jews actually
lived within the Russian domain—the beginnings of the sort of
utilitarian approach Demidov accuses the state of taking with regard
9

Ibid., 322.
Ibid.
11
Israel Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 1772-1881 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 34.
10
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to the Jews are evident much earlier. Throughout the eighteenth
century, Russian leaders faced a number of difficult decisions
concerning whether to rescind previously enacted restrictions on Jews
in order to boost economic gains. Living in the bordering PolishLithuanian Commonwealth, Jewish merchants developed strong
trading relationships with their Russian counterparts. Though Russian
law barred them from residing within the empire, certain provisions
allowed Jews to commute across the border for weekly markets and
less frequent fairs that proved beneficial for Jewish and Russian
merchants alike.12 When Russian legislation against Jews severed, or
even limited, these interstate trading relationships, petitions and
complaints from merchants spelling out the potential loss of economic
profit often persuaded the state to retract the offending laws. In the
lead up to the Polish Partitions, this same pattern played out time and
again, placing the Russian state's traditional religious intolerance of
and general aversion toward Jews in direct conflict with the empire's
economic interests.
After the initial partition in 1772, Empress Catherine II assured
the Jews of White Russia that they would “retain and preserve those
freedoms that they now enjoy by law regarding the control of their
property because the humaneness of Her Imperial Majesty will not
permit anyone to be excluded from Her all-encompassing
generosity.”13 However, a proclamation delivered by a different
Catherine—Catherine I—almost a half century earlier in 1727 holds
equal significance in understanding how the Jewish Question formed
in Russia. Yielding to reoccurring complaints about Jewish tavern
keepers and farmers, Catherine I issued a decree in 1727 that expelled
all Jews from the Ukraine (then a part of the Russian Empire) and any
other towns in Russia. As Demidov explains, Catherine intended to
12

John Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the "Jewish Question"
in Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), 28.
13
Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 58.
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ensure that all Jews “shall be immediately expelled beyond the
frontier and not be allowed under any circumstances to enter
Russia.”14 Yet, when confronted with a fairly similar amount of
pressure from Russian merchants on the other side of this debate the
empress appears to have largely rolled back the restrictions. Despite
the fact that Catherine I issued an expulsion decree that minced few
words, when petitions poured into the government from disgruntled
merchants and officials in various parts of the district, Empress Anna
finally restored the right for Jews to participate in retail and wholesale
trade throughout all of Ukraine in 1734.15
As this example demonstrates, the Russian Empire's economic
interests had the potential to supersede policies the state had
established in the spirit of traditional religious intolerance toward the
Jews. Historian John Klier makes this point when he remarks how
“pragmatic considerations could temper even Russian intolerance,” on
religious grounds.16 Considering the persistence of religious hostility
directed at Jews in Russia, this alone was quite an accomplishment.
As evidence that these religious sentiments still lingered in
contemporary Russia, Aleksandr Voznitsyn, a retired naval officer
who had converted to Judaism, and Borokh Leibov, a Jew from the
Smolensk district charged with converting him, were both burned at
the stake for their infractions in St. Petersburg in July 1738.17 Before
his death Leibov had actually played a leading role in Catherine I's
aforementioned declaration barring all Jews from Ukraine in 1727.
While working as a farmer in Smolensk, an important border town for
moving goods into Russia from Poland, Leibov helped build a
synagogue for some Jews in the nearby village of Zverovich.18 These
14
15
16
17
18
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actions ignited protests from the local Orthodox clergy that prompted
Catherine to expel Jews, setting the stage for the showdown between
traditional religious sentiments and economic gain that resurfaced so
often during this period.
Shortly after her ascension to the throne in 1741, Elizabeth, the
devoutly Orthodox daughter of Peter I, targeted religious minorities in
the empire—especially Muslims and Jews—by announcing the
expulsion of “these haters of the name of Christ, the Savior.”19 Once
again, religious intolerance and economic considerations clashed with
the execution of this policy. In response to her expulsion order, some
Riga merchants drafted a petition for the Senate to express their fears
that such a policy might induce substantial economic ramifications
due to the “loss of their Jewish middlemen in trade with Poland.”20
Administrators from Lifland province aired similar concerns,
complaining to the Senate that "the commerce of Riga may be entirely
destroyed, and there will be no one to sell the foreign goods
imported," with Jews expelled from the district.21 However, instead of
allowing all these claims of severe economic detriment to overwhelm
her religiously motivated policy, Elizabeth fired back with a wellknown retort when the Senate requested she reconsider: “I desire no
mercenary profit from the enemies of Christ.”22 Even though
Elizabeth's seemingly unshakable religious faith ensured that she
would not deviate from expulsion order, a close reading reveals—
specifically the word “profit”—that she too considered Jews, and
other religious minorities, an economic boon for Russia.
Perhaps none of Elizabeth's fellow tsars and tsarinas shared her
exact obstinacy when it came to the matter of acquiring a “profit”
from the “enemies of Christ.” Despite retaining her predecessor's ban
19
20
21
22

Ibid.
Ibid.
Demidov, The Jewish Question in Russia, 41.
Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 29.
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on Jewish settlement upon taking the throne in June 1762, Catherine
II showed a willingness to overlook religious differences when
seemingly more significant economic and security considerations
surfaced. Almost immediately after taking control, Catherine issued
her first of two Imperial Manifestos –one in 1762 and another in
1763—with the intention of recruiting foreign settlers to populate
Russian territories in the southern and western parts of the empire.23
Even before the Polish Partitions, Russia possessed massive amounts
of excessive land in these regions. In fact, the 1763 Imperial
Manifesto plainly notes that “a great many…Places for the settlement
and Habitation of Mankind...remaine (sic) yet uncultivated.”24 While
underpopulation remained a major concern for Catherine, Roger
Bartlett explains that Russia's drive for foreign immigration also
meshed with the “mercantilist and cameralist theories of statecraft
prominent in Europe in the early and middle decades of the
century.”25 On a more practical level, Catherine's immigration
program assisted in the growth of the economy, both from the
standpoint of general population increase and “specifically through
the use of immigrants to encourage trade, industry and agriculture.”26
When Catherine sent the Initial drafts of her 1762 Imperial decree
to the Senate, she excluded Jews from the ranks of potential foreign
settlers for Russia's sparsely populated southern and western
borderlands. Hinting at religious difference, the October 14, 1762
draft stated: “to receive henceforth into Russia without further report
to Us all persons wishing to settle, except Jews. We hope in time by
this means to increase the glory of God and his Orthodox faith, and
the well-being of Our Empire.”27 The final line perfectly encapsulates
23

Roger P. Bartlett, Human Capital: The Settlement of Foreigners in Russia
1762-1804 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), xiii.
24
Ibid., 32.
25
Ibid., 2.
26
Ibid., 3.
27
Ibid., 35.
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the dilemma facing Russian officials. Most often in regards to the
Jewish Question, the choice came between maintaining the purity of
the Orthodox faith within Russia and the “well-being of Our Empire.”
When Catherine issued a revised Imperial Manifesto a year later,
mention of Jewish exclusion was curiously missing. This time Jews
became directly involved in the recruitment process. Some Russian
immigration officials secretly used Jewish emissaries to recruit Jews
from Prussia and Poland for districts in New Russia.28 And Russian
officials seemingly opened the door to any prospective settler, which
is clear from this circular sent to southern border authorities in 1764:
“People of any nationality and [religious] observance crossing the
border with the intention of entering service or settling in the New
Russia province shall immediately be admitted into the
aforementioned province. They shall not be asked their nationality, or
required to produce passports.”29
Looking past the irony of the
Russian government actively seeking out Jews to settle in particular
parts of empire—a scenario that would replay itself with far-off
colonization programs in the nineteenth century—an expulsion decree
still restricted Jewish residence in most other districts. Nevertheless,
only eight short years after enacting this rather curious colonization
policy, Catherine II would sign the first of the Polish Partitions,
shortly making Russia home to one of the world's largest Jewish
populations. Catherine perhaps embodies the perfect Russian leader
for the sort of Jewish policy Demidov articulated. Throughout her
reign Catherine willingly bent entrenched rules regarding the Jews in
order to derive an economic or strategic benefit for Russia. Polonsky
explains this tendency quite well when he argues that “Finance
conditions—the need to pay for the wars of the eighteenth century and

28
29

Ibid., 62.
Ibid.
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the attendant imperial expansion—were also a constant factor in
determining her policies.”30
From the relatively short period between Catherine I's expulsion
decree in 1727 and Catherine II's proclamation of supreme generosity
toward the Jews in 1772, Russian policy seems to have made some
fairly substantial shifts in regards to the Jewish Question. Clearly, the
Russian Empire had not evolved into a completely accepting,
Enlightenment-minded state in the course of some 45 years. That
Catherine II set in motion what would become the Pale of Settlement
less than 20 years after the latter of these two dates assures us that this
is certainly not the case. What changed then during this period? Most
significantly, the traditional religious intolerance that had longed
barred Jews from Russia started to give way to the same sort of
economic interests Demidov describes in his report. As Bartal
explains, the two primary problems the Russian state encountered
following the partitions included how best to integrate the Jews and
how to organize Jewish economic “activity so that it would be of
benefit to the state and at the same time not harm the economic
interests of other groups in the population.”31 While an obvious longterm concern, religious difference hardly constituted a major issue at
this time since “the trends of enlightened absolutism were dominant,”
and the “Jews in Russia were not necessarily perceived according to
the traditional Christian image but as a population of great economic
value.”32
Some decisions the Russian state committed to immediately
following the Polish Partitions support Demidov's claims about the
“narrow utilitarian spirit,” that often motivated its policy. Klier offers
a fascinating suggestion when he questions why Catherine II failed to
employ the most “Muscovite” approach to the partitions by simply
30
31
32
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expelling all Jews residing in the areas of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth that Russia annexed.33 This approach would have
jibed best with supreme religious intolerance. However, as Demidov
suggests, perhaps the Russian state allowed Jews to remain in the
same provinces they occupied before the partitions, which eventually
became the Pale of Settlement, in order to derive maximum economic
benefit from their inclusion in the empire. In another calculating
maneuver, the Russian state opted to “retain and expand” the Jewish
autonomous institutions after the first partition.34 Part of the reason
for this policy is the Russian government feared that administrative
weaknesses might lead to losses in tax revenue. Lacking the means to
collect taxes from most Jewish communities, the state had to rely on
the kahal to gather taxes from the members of its community. In this
way, the government permitted Jews to preserve their autonomous
communities (the extension of a right) in exchange for a consistent
method of tax collection for the Russian state (a valuable economic
benefit)—a government-initiated tradeoff executed much as Demidov
suggested.
Defining Jewish “Usefulness” Through Nineteenth Century Policy
As Enlightenment ideas gained increasing prevalence in Eastern
Europe toward the middle of the eighteenth century, the influence of
powerful notions of the individual recast societal bonds. Now instead
of large collections of groups, societies were thought to consist of
individuals who each possessed their rights while also maintaining
various obligations to the state. As Enlightenment influences reached
Russia, societal structures and the economic landscape adapted
accordingly. Adam Teller explains precisely how these larger social
and economic shifts impacted Jews as they came within the fold of
the Russian Empire: “The economic component of this ideology—
33
34

Klier, Russia Gathers Her Jews, 30.
Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 332.
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physiocracy—that valued the natural economy and agricultural work
above all, viewed Jewish economic activity negatively. It argued that
in order to make Jews useful members of society, their economic life
should be reformed to make it more 'productive.' In real terms, this
meant causing Jews to abandon petty trade in favor of agriculture, or
at least crafts and industrial labor.”35 Russian officials strove to more
fully integrate Jews into the empire's economic order while
simultaneously employing them in those industries considered
desirable or in demand to secure the greatest boon for the empire’s
economy. Evidence of such motives is strewn through state legislation
from Alexander I's Jewish Constitution in 1804 to Alexander II's more
permissive laws that allowed certain Jews to reside outside the Pale of
Settlement in the 1860s.
With the Polish Partitions now complete and a nascent Pale of
Settlement forming along the western borderlands of the empire,
Russia's Jewish policy became more focused at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. After the rather short half-decade reign of
Catherine's son Paul, the empire welcomed a new tsar to the throne in
1801: Alexander I. For the next quarter century, Alexander would
orchestrate Russia's efforts to “transform” the Jews into useful and
productive subjects capable of helping boost the empire's often
sluggish and unsatisfactory—when compared to Western powers—
economic performance. Few contemporary Russian officials would
likely consider the task easy. Jews had acquired several unpleasant
stereotypes that the Russian government, in the spirit of the
Enlightenment, hoped it could purge en route to morphing them into
positive, contributing members of the empire. First, many Russians
claimed Jews “disrupted relations between landlords and peasants in

35

Adam Teller, “Economic Life,” YIVO Encyclopedia of Jews in Eastern
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the sensitive western provinces,” with their “oppressive” behavior.36
A related accusation that severely complicated the Jewish Question in
Russia contended that Jews exploited peasants in the countryside,
prompting much legislation to protect the latter group from these
devious Jewish traders and tavern keepers. The other perceived hurdle
to shaping Jews into useful subjects was they supposedly “disdained
physical labor,” and “felt should be performed by the 'inferior'
peasant.”37 Despite these potential pitfalls, Russian leaders had a
“high regard for Jewish commercial acumen,” and believed that, with
the proper legislation in place, they could represent a useful and
economically beneficial asset for the empire.38
Alexander's issuance of the Statute Concerning the Organization
of the Jews—or, as it is more commonly known, the Jewish
Constitution—on December 9, 1804 marked a seminal moment in the
relationship between the Russian state and its Jewish subjects. The
statute aimed to overhaul Jewish life, delving into areas as far-ranging
as education, economics, religion and community associations. In this
way, the Jewish Constitution of 1804 represented the first significant
attempt on the part of the Russian government to define Jewish
usefulness. Reacting to complaints from Russian natives about Jews
working as innkeepers and tavern keepers in the Western provinces,
Alexander barred all Jews from agriculture-related leasing in article
34 of the statute in order to “increase the economic benefits they
provided,” and encourage “Jewish agricultural settlement.”39
Relatedly, the statute abolished all Jewish leaseholders from the
villages: “No Jew, beginning on the 1st of January 1808, in the
provinces of Astrakhan and Caucasia, and in those of Little Russia
and New Russia, and from the 1st of January 1808, elsewhere, in any
36
37
38
39

Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 328.
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village or in the countryside, is allowed to hold a lease on a tavern,
drinking house or inn … nor to sell liquor, nor even to live where this
is done, except when passing through.”40 Despite the specificity
demonstrated above, the policy remained only partially implemented
for all practical purposes came to a halt with a Jewish committee
report in March 1812 that claimed, “Jews performed valuable
economic functions in the countryside.”41
At the heart of the Jewish Constitution of 1804, the Russian state
began to sketch its definition of a useful Jewish subject. Dubnow
characterizes the government's attempts nicely when he writes that
from an economic standpoint “the new statute establishes two
opposite poles,” a “negative pole” that includes “the rural occupations
of innkeeping and land-tenure” and a “positive pole” that features
agriculture, “which on the contrary is to be stimulated and promoted
among Jews in every possible manner.”42 According to the statute's
provisions, all Jews were placed in one of four economic categories:
merchants, townspeople, manufacturers and artisans, and farmers.
Furthermore, the state offered loans to individuals who established
factories which were “in particular demand” in hopes of spurring
Jewish enrollment in occupations such as industry, manufacturing and
artisanry.43 Demidov even cites a ukase from July 29, 1827 that states,
“the Government measures adopted for deriving State advantages
from this race by the enactment of the special Regulations of 1804 for
the administration of the Jews, and the contrivance of means for the
transfer of Jews from villages to the towns have not as yet been
attended with the desired success."44 While a number of factors—
including recent events, the intended audience and unknown political

40
41
42
43
44
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circumstances—might ultimately be responsible for the mention of
“deriving State advantages from this race,” its inclusion remains
rather curious, and serves as fairly solid evidence that the Russia state
perceived Jews as a tool for which to derive economic benefit.
One potentially overlooked factor that demonstrates the
importance that Alexander I placed on the ability for Jews to
substantially contribute to the empire's economic vitality is the
unprecedented amount of attention the tsar devoted to the topic. Prior
to Alexander establishing the Committee for the Organization of
Jewish Life in November 1802, no formal body specifically for the
investigation of Jewish legislation and issues had existed in the tsarist
empire or Poland. Within the next couple years the government
formed yet another commission. Then in January 1809 Alexander
appointed a third Jewish Committee, “with a mandate to examine all
aspects of the problem of how Jews could be diverted from the rural
economy and the liquor trade to other economic activities.”45 In
March 1812, after three years of hard work, the committee released a
report that argued Jews should be permitted to sell alcohol in the
countryside (“It is not true that the village Jew enriches himself at the
expense of the peasant. On the contrary, he is generally poor, and ekes
out a scanty existence from the sale of liquor...”) and fought
forcefully against article 34 of the Jewish Constitution of 1804
banning Jews from leaseholding (“The recent experiments of the
Government have had no effect. On the contrary, the Jewish people
'has not only remained in the same state of poverty, but has even been
reduced to greater destitution, as a result of having been forced out of
a pursuit which had provided it with a livelihood for several
centuries.'”).46 With Napoleon's army advancing toward Russia's
western border, Alexander reasoned that the empire would be better
off with the Jews remaining in the countryside for now. However, this
45
46

Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 349.
Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, 354.

113

Anthós, Vol. V, Issue 1
would not mark the final time a Russian tsar ordered the formation of
a committee to investigate the Jewish Question.
While Russian leaders openly expressed their desire to refashion
Jews into an economically beneficial group in the articles of their
statutes and decrees, often times the less provocative language
contained in these documents proves just as valuable for the historian.
A prime example of this concept is Nicholas I’s Recruitment Statute
of the Jews issued on August 26, 1827. The statute ordered that “for
the relief of all Our loyal subjects, the recruitment duty be equalized
for all categories of subjects liable to it, We order that Jews be
required to fulfill the recruitment duty in person,” rather than pay a
500-rouble exemption tax.47 As a militant person who regarded “all
human life as being nothing more than service because everyone must
serve,” Nicholas believed the army could cure the ills of Jewish
society, thus helping Russia solve its problem with Jews and
cultivating a growing group of useful economic contributors.48 In this
way, the military would serve as a sort of classroom for the twelve to
twenty-five year-old Jewish recruits since “they would learn not only
Russian but also useful skills and crafts, and eventually they would
become his loyal subjects.”49 However, Nicholas planned to protect a
select group of individuals from the compulsory twenty-five year
conscription terms. Aside from rabbis, the other categories of exempt
Jews possessed some level of economic usefulness, or potential
economic usefulness, for the Russian state: members of the merchant
estate (likely paying hefty taxes and stimulating the economy with
many financial transactions), Jews who had taken courses in statesponsored institutions (learning the language and practical skills the
47
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government desires) and those living on Jewish agricultural colonies
(which the state wished to develop into productive, lucrative ventures
in formerly barren districts). Apparently Russia’s definition of Jewish
usefulness changed little because a couple decades later Alexander II
would select similar groups for exemption from the Pale of
Settlement.
Following the reoccurrence of famine in the former Polish
provinces in the late 1830s, Nicholas sought new methods to solve the
Jewish Question. For this purpose, he enlisted the assistance of Pavel
Kiselev, who was charged with investigating the issue and reporting
his findings. Kiselev’s recommendations might represent the most
poignant example of the Russian state’s efforts to define Jewish
usefulness in the nineteenth century. Kiselev took the opportunity to
call for a “fundamental transformation of this nation … [by] the
removal of those harmful factors that obstruct its path to the general
civil order.”50 Beyond banning separate Jewish dress and setting up
schools that would teach Russian language and history, Kiselev’s
program greatly emphasized the importance of Jews taking up the
sorts of “useful” occupations the Russian state had been encouraging
them to embrace since Alexander I assumed the throne in 1801.51 Not
stopping at a mere outline of his proposal to “transform” Russia’s
Jews, Kiselev offered an execution plan to accelerate the
“productivization” of the Jews. Based on particular criteria, the
government would separate Jews into “productive” and “nonproductive” categories. Members of the latter group would have five
years to establish—by “stable residence through the ownership of
property or by becoming artisans, farmers, or guild merchants”—their
case for elevation into the “productive” category. If unsuccessful,
however, Kiselev’s guidelines dictated that these “non-productive”
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Jews would be conscripted or forcibly retrained for one of the
aforementioned occupations.
Despite its radical nature—and the fiery opposition it touched off
among Nicholas I’s advisors—Kiselev’s plan served as the basis for
the Russian state’s reclassification policy adopted in 1846. Much like
the proposal Kiselev offered, Jews would have to prove themselves as
useful by joining a merchant guild, owning property in a city or town,
becoming a member of an artisan guild, or declaring as a farmer—for
whom the government would subsidize with financial support.52 The
new law required all Jews to register for their chosen category by
January 1, 1850, with any Jew who failed to do so liable to “suffer the
unpleasant consequences which their persistence on the path of evil
must to.”53 Even though Kiselev’s plan earned the tsar’s blessing, as
Stanislawski points out, it missed the target because most of the Jews
who the government sought to improve through the reclassification
program were too impoverished to cobble together enough money to
learn a new trade or buy admission into a guild—let alone purchase a
house in a city or town.54 “The illness of the Jews, their poverty and
exploitation of the peasants,” Stanislawski argues, “would only be
exacerbated by crowding them into the big cities without sufficient
means of support.”55 Thanks in part to the inability of Jews to
dramatically change their circumstances and the dysfunction common
to the tsarist bureaucracy, the deadline for Jews to register in the
categories passed. First it was extended to July 1, 1852 then
November 1, 1852, but enforcement never came. The combination of
the Crimean War starting less than a year later in October 1853 plus
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the Nicholas’s death sixteen months later are often cited as the
primary reasons for this policy remaining unimplemented.56
This exact same combination—the Crimean War loss and death
of Nicholas I—ushered in a series of sweeping changes in the middle
of the 1850s. By virtue of its defeat in the Crimean War, Russia faced
mounting debt and the harsh reality of economic and military
inferiority to stronger Western powers such as Britain and France.57
Replacing the deceased tsar, the new leader Alexander II sought to
“narrow the gap between Russia and the European powers,” an
ambition that would substantially alter Jewish life in the coming
decades.58 The first domino to fall came with the abolition of serfdom
in 1861, which rapidly propelled Russia form the depths of an
agricultural feudal economy toward a primarily capitalistic one. Since
many Jews still depended on the leasehold system, this sudden change
constituted a significant shock that forced them to seek other means of
employment to survive. But the next domino affected Jewish society
even more directly. Shortly after becoming tsar, Alexander convened
the Jewish Committee to review legislation concerning the Jews—a
common practice for new nineteenth century Russian leaders. When
the committee canvassed the Pale of Settlement to ask the various
province governors whether restrictions on Jewish residence and
occupations should be lessened, many advocated “the immediate
granting of civil rights to the Jews and allowing them freedom of both
residence and choice of occupation.”59 Several even highlighted the
positive national economic ramifications such a policy would have if
enacted. Unfortunately for the Jews, the Jewish Committee wished for
a more gradual emancipation process that would assure Jews had
56

Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 385.
R. M. Guseinov, "The Phantom of Capitalism in Russia (I)," Problems of
Economic Transition 42, no. 12 (2000): 37-52.
58
Bartal, The Jews of Eastern Europe, 102.
59
Polonsky, The Jews in Poland and Russia, 395.
57

117

Anthós, Vol. V, Issue 1
“reformed their communal life, acquired Western-style education, and
become engaged in ‘useful’ occupations.”60
Following the pattern of previous policies regarding the Jews
during this period, Alexander’s decision of which Jewish groups
would first experience eased restrictions weighed heavily on
economic considerations. To be fair, Russian officials also took into
account which Jewish groups would least likely clash with peasants,
but the choices speak for themselves in terms of their potential
financial attractiveness to the government. Three main groups of Jews
fit this criterion: merchants of the first guild, university graduates
(recipients of doctorates, master’s or bachelor’s degrees) and all
artisans that possessed membership to a guild.61 From March 1859 to
June 1865, the Russian state relaxed restrictions on the
aforementioned groups, allowing them to exit the Pale of Settlement
in search of more enticing opportunities in the interior of the empire.
Only the artisans—which included craftsmen, mechanics, distillers,
brewers and others—were forced to follow specific protocols for fear
they might exploit peasants or become unproductive. With that said,
artisans had to routinely obtain passports from their hometowns in the
Pale and return there if they became unemployed.62 Even though this
policy may have opened the interior for an estimated one-fifth of the
Jewish population in the Pale, the bureaucratic laws deterred most
eligible Jews from leaving at this time.63
Alexander’s policy of exempting a small percentage of the most
“useful” Jews from the harshness of life in the Pale of Settlement
serves as the best representation of Demidov’s accusation that the
Russian state often offered a “certain extension of civil rights [to be]
60
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made in favor of the Jews,” in exchange for " the acquisition of
material benefits for the State from this race.”64 With each major
piece of major legislation concerning the Jews from Catherine II to
Nicholas I, the Russian state further defined the Pale of Settlement’s
boundaries, which effectively sealed its provinces off as bastion of
economic underperformance and Jewish poverty. Many officials in
the Russian government believed, like the liberal newspaper Golos
(The Voice) that the Russian peasantry would “would be ‘eaten alive’
by the literate and crafty Jews if the latter were allowed free entry into
the interior.”65 However, much like the conflict between religious
intolerance and economic considerations Russian leaders encountered
before the Polish Partitions in the eighteenth century, when the state
wished to rectify the well-known “unfavorable comparison between
Russia and Western Europe in terms of development,” it would draft
policies allowing the most prosperous, economically beneficial Jews
to live or conduct business outside the Pale of Settlement.66
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Russian state demonstrated a
keen interest in the development of Jews into “useful” and
“productive” subjects who would derive immense economic benefits
for the state. When the time came to endow Jews with some level of
emancipation during Alexander II’s attempts to revamp the Russian
economy, there is little surprise that the first groups to earn the
privileges of residence and occupation choice perfectly matched the
state’s long-crafted definition of “usefulness.”
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How the State’s Jewish Legislation Impacted Relations between
Russians and Jews
The Russian government’s focus on deriving economic benefits
from Jews during the period starting in the middle of the eighteenth
century and ending with Alexander II’s death in 1881 was not
responsible for the deep schism between native Orthodox Russians
and Jews. Religious tensions and political squabbles between the two
groups are thought to date back to the late fifteenth century under the
rule of Muscovite Russia.67 Therefore Russian policies enacted three
to four centuries later might have exacerbated existing problems but
could not reasonably be considered the cause of them. With that said,
the Russian state perpetuated relations between Jews and non-Jews in
the empire through its policies in a few significant ways: The
establishment of the Pale of Settlement increased Jewish separateness
and the erratic nature of Russia’s Jewish policy made it challenging
for society to settle around a firm understanding of the Jews within
the Russian Empire.
Representations of Jewish deviation from the rest of Russian
society constituted one of the primary targets of state restrictions
during the nineteenth century. Whether focusing on autonomous
organizations, traditional Jewish dress or teachings at Jewish religious
schools, the general thrust of Russian legislation sought to remove
these perceived barriers from rest of the population. Sergey Uvarov
must have considered this part of his motive when he vowed to
accomplish “a complete transformation of Jewish life” in the early
1840s.68 At the same time, however, the Russian state used the Pale of
Settlement as a sort of pen for “unproductive” Jews. Even before
Alexander II opened the interior up to the Jewish population’s best
and brightest in the late 1850s and early 1860s, legislation in 1835
67
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“permitted only short, temporary sojourns outside the Pale,” for elite
merchants.69 While Russian leaders rewarded a small handful of Jews,
the vast majority had no exposure to life outside the Pale of
Settlement. This lack of face-to-face experience with Russians made
Jewish stereotypes much more powerful, which may have aided in the
rise of anti-Semitism in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Louis Greenberg explains the problem: “the Jew as a human being
was practically an unknown entity to the Russian people. Whatever
notion did exist about him was usually distortion and caricature. Even
in classic Russian literature the Jew appears either as an unreal being
or as a ludicrous creature.”70
Beyond the matter of Russian state forcibly separating Jews and
non-Jews through the creation of the Pale of Settlement, the constant
twists and turns of the government’s Jewish policy probably took
quite a toll on relations between the two groups. Above all else, the
state created a scenario with a moving target. No one ever quite knew
where the Jews stood—except for at the top—or where they might be
headed in the coming weeks and months. The constant back and forth
likely transfixed society in a sort of perpetual unease regarding the
Jewish Question. For example, Alexander II might take two steps
forward with the partial emancipation of a select few Jews. But the
backlash would arrive swiftly in the form of the Russian press running
headlines that remarked “The Jew is on the Move” and Russian
writers complaining about the number of Jews enrolled in the
secondary and higher education system.71 Predictably, Alexander
would have to change course once Christian pressure became too
much, which obviously happened in this instance. The inability of the
state to outline a specific policy—rather than opportunistically
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jumping from issue to issue—created a situation where RussianJewish relations were bound to fester then fail.
Conclusion
What this review of Russia’s policy toward Jews from the middle
of the eighteenth century to the end of Alexander II’s reign
demonstrates is the sheer complexity of the Jewish Question in the
Russian Empire. Clearly no single motivation prompted Russia’s
leaders to enact the various policies they passed during this period.
On this point, Demidov’s theory misses the mark. The Russian noble
claimed that the state’s consistent pursuit of economic enhancement
served as the “main principle” underlying Russian legislation
concerning Jews. After a complete and thorough examination of
Russia’s policy, it remains unknown whether this impulse acted as the
main principle when Russian officials they crafted the various pieces
of legislation that affected Jews living in the empire. While the
statutes and decrees that Demidov cites often blatantly speak about
the government’s wish to derive economic benefits from the Jews
from the configuration of its policies, the historian must also consider
that officials frequently include certain language in documents to
mask their actual intentions. This makes gleaning their actual
meaning and motivations virtually impossible. Another matter to
consider is that the Russian government framed its Jewish policies
hoping to achieve several goals at the same time. Maybe it sought to
protect the peasants from Jewish exploitation while concurrently
gaining an economic advantage from the Jewish population.
Determining where the aim of one part of the policy ends and another
begins is another quandary capable of forever baffling the historian.
With that said, overwhelming evidence exists to show that the
Russian government hoped to craft policies during this period that
would transform Jews into economically advantageous subjects for
the empire. Even before the Polish Partitions, the state demonstrated a
propensity to allow economic considerations to supersede traditional
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forms of religious intolerance, which typically kept Jews outside the
empire’s borders. However, when Jewish presence was determined
beneficial at local fairs or settling the western and southern provinces,
the Russian state suddenly felt compelled to relax such restrictions.
Following the Polish Partitions, Russia’s policy toward Jews became
more focused on how the state could gain from the new additions to
the empire. Beginning with the Jewish Constitution of 1804, the
Russian state sought to define Jewish usefulness. For the most part,
this meant transferring Jews out of leasehold jobs such as tavern
keeping and innkeeping and into more “useful” and “productive”
occupations that would help Russia develop into an economic
powerhouse capable of rivaling those in the West. Subsequent pieces
of legislation such as the military conscription policy, reclassification
and Alexander II’s easing of residence and occupation restrictions all
separated “productive” and “non-productive” Jews in some
capacity—rewarding the former while punishing the latter.
All of this evidence is enough to prove that while the Russian
state may not have attempted to answer the Jewish Question in
exactly the manner Demidov proposes, the prospect of deriving
economic benefits from Jews certainly influenced the decisionmaking of officials when they crafted policies that affected Jews.
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